Prejudices, Emotions and Power of Political Restraint:

A Study in the Second Crusade

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Regardless of historical era or geographical region, the human mind has always embraced certain stereotypes with respect to other nationalities, religions and cultures. These stereotypes are products of miscellaneous influences ranging from personal experiences and misunderstandings, through contrasting values, to literature and propaganda. The recent dispute over the European Stability Mechanism and a bailout loan for Greece that created – with sufficient help of a politically motivated campaign – a caricature of lazy and pampered Greeks living in luxury at the expense of European citizens is a perfect illustration of such a process. It might be more suitable, however, to speak of revival instead of creation, since the notion of Greek laziness has been present in Western Latin writings since the Middle Ages.

Historical research of the relations between the Byzantine and Latin spheres in the medieval era, especially during the crusading period, often leads to questions of mutual perceptions and prejudiced images of the other part of the Christian world. Based on the testimony of contemporary chronicles, two basic stereotypical images of the Byzantines and the Latins can be defined. The most exhaustive analysis of the Western view of the Eastern Empire was done by Marc Carrier in his excellent dissertation; the image he extracted from Latin narratives is that of a perfidious, effeminate, greedy, indolent Greek who is also characterized by his excessive flattery and lack of honour.\(^1\) Secondly, as summarized by Alexander Kazhdan, the Byzantine literature produced a model of an arrogant, cruel, untrustworthy and greedy Latin barbarian who wished

\(^1\) The term *Latin* is employed in its broader cultural sense referring to the peoples of the European West and standing in opposition to the Byzantine East. Such an understanding was established in Byzantium by the twelfth century and surpasses a purely linguistic or religious meaning. Alexander Kazhdan, “Latins and Franks in Byzantium: Perception and Reality from the Eleventh to the Twelfth Century,” in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parvitz Mottahedeh (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2001), 86-87.

\(^2\) Marc Carrier, “L’image des Byzantins et les systèmes de représentation selon les chroniqueurs occidentaux des croisades 1096-1261” (PhD diss., Université Panthéon-Sorbonne, 2006), 73-74, 83-85
nothing else than to conquer the empire and its capital.  

The negative influence of the prejudices is sometimes used as an argument in the interpretation of crusades and East-West relations in general. The present case study of French-Byzantine relations during the Second Crusade (1147 – 1149), which examines ties between the stereotypes, emotions and the course of the campaign, aims to question such an argumentation as well as to oppose the idea that stereotypical images had the power to affect historical events.

When treating such sensitive subjects as emotions, prejudices or perceptions, one is always confronted with the limits of contemporary sources. The quantitative and qualitative disproportion between Byzantine and French materials, the disproportion between descriptions of attitudes of different social and political groups, and, most importantly, the relevance of authorial bias must be taken into account in the present case. For instance, the famous anti-Byzantine remarks of Odo of Deuil, the chaplain of the French King Louis VII, whose chronicle De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem is the main source for the expedition, could be seen as a partial reflection of the French attitude at the time close to the chronicle’s creation (summer 1148).  

As for earlier

Kazhdan, “Latins and Franks,” 87-88. The list of the Byzantine and Latin stereotypes is far from complete. The present selection is based upon frequency of epithets in the twelfth- and thirteenth-century sources that have been part of my past researches. For more complete bibliography related to the topic see Carrier, “L’image,” 6-18.

Odo of Deuil, De profectione (cited hereafter as Odo). At the time of final corrections of the present essay I gained access to the formerly unattainable work of Henry Mayr-Harting “Odo of Deuil, the Second Crusade and the Monastery of Saint-Denis” that prompted me to reassess certain premises and conclusions of my research, especially with regard to the extent to which De profectione mirrors real feelings of the French towards Byzantium. Despite Odo’s obvious anti-Byzantine purpose, his recount of the crusade’s events is considered very accurate (Virginia G. Berry, introduction to De profectione, xxi-xxii.); it was exactly his account of events in Asia Minor (cf. Odo, books 5-7) that have led me to believe that exclusively during this last phase of the French journey through Byzantine territory, Odo’s anti-Greek feelings were shared by majority. No less important arguments were the chronological closeness to the time of the source’s creation and a letter sent from Antioch immediately after the march through Asia Minor, in which the king, formerly of pro-Byzantine position, finally assumed the opposite stance (see below). Louis VII to Suger, 1148, RHGF 15, 496.

Although I do not find Mayr-Harting’s suggested dating of the chronicle to 1150, intriguing as it is, conclusive, I must accept his argument that Louis’s letter mentions the Byzantine deceit only “in passing and amidst other problems.” Mayr-Harting, “Odo of Deuil,” 229. Odo’s anti-Byzantine attitude truly cannot be viewed as dominant, not even during the last phase in Asia Minor. This does not, however, deny the existence of the feelings expressed by the chronicler among the French army. He might have been only the representative of a single group, but our evidence indicates that this group
phases of the crusaders’ march, implications about emotional development are drawn from events described, but the author’s comments must be ignored. Therefore, source criticism and a profound historical reconstruction of the crusade have been a prerequisite for this research.

Out of two Western armies heading to Syria in 1147 led by the German king Conrad III and the French king Louis VII, only the latter one is of concern here. The period of known contacts between the French and the Byzantines extended to the end of February 1148, when Louis’ men sailed from the Byzantine port Antalya to Antioch.\(^5\) It is convenient to provisionally divide the period into several smaller parts to observe the development over time.

**The role of prejudices and emotions at the beginning of the crusade**

The first, preparatory phase is marked by the calls for the crusade in December 1145 and the arrival of the French army to Regensburg in mid-July 1147. There is really no evidence for the application of the prejudiced characteristics or any manifestation of emotions towards the French or the Byzantines during this time. The only exception might be the case of a council of French elites in Étampes in February 1147 that was meant to decide about a route to the Holy land. There were two possibilities: an overland path through Byzantine territory, or a sea-way with assistance from the Kingdom of Sicily. Odo of Deuil was an eyewitness of the whole campaign and took part in the council. He recorded that “*There were men in the assembly who said that the Greeks, as they had learned either by reading or by experience, were deceitful.*”\(^6\) Despite appearances, the extract cannot be regarded as persuasive evidence for anti-Byzantine feelings of the French party. Firstly, we do not have a proof supporting Virginia G. Berry’s assumption that it was the French who accused Greeks of treachery.\(^7\)

According to the same source, a Sicilian embassy was present at the meeting and tried to

grew stronger, if not prevailing, at the end of the researched period and it is this development that is of concern to the present paper. Therefore, if we bear these limits in mind and avoid generalization, Odo’s biased comments are a relevant primary source for the French moods at a certain point of time.

\(^5\) This and all future date references correspond with those in Phillips, *The Second Crusade;* or with the results of my own research: Zuzana Černáková, “Byzantsko-francúzske vzťahy počas druhej križiackej výpravy” (MA thesis., Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, 2012).

\(^6\) ‘*Interfuere congregatis qui Graecos dicerent sicut lectione at experientia noverant fraudulentos.*’ Odo, 12.

to discourage Louis from taking the land route. Considering the notorious animosity between Byzantium and Sicily, it seems more probable that it was these foreign envoys, and not the French participants, who warned against Greek perfidy. Secondly, although the French court was aware of the Byzantine clichés mediated by authors who wrote about the First Crusade or by other means, the silence of our sources in this matter indicates that the information was not of much importance at the time of the preparations for the second expedition. Therefore, it is adequate to say that prejudice against Greeks did not stir up a substantial commotion and definitely did not influence crucial decisions at the beginning of the crusade. After all, the result of the conference in Étampes was clearly in favour of the land route and cooperation with Byzantium. Moreover, if prejudiced dislike were to play a part, why would Louis even ask the Byzantine emperor for assistance as he did in 1146?

Byzantine sources that are considerably briefer than Odo’s account allow only few, general conclusions about Byzantine moods during the crusade. They concentrate on the activities of Emperor Manuel I Komnenos and tell about several preventive measures taken as a reaction to the news of the expedition, namely a demand of sworn promise for the safety of the empire, renovations of Constantinople’s fortification

8 Odo, 14.


10 It must be stressed that this had happened before the German king took the cross and before his friendship with Byzantium could influence Louis’s plans. Although Louis’s own letter did not survive, its content is known from the emperor’s preserved response. Manuel I to Louis VII, 1146, RHGF 16, 9-10. The king’s request is mentioned also in Odo, 10.

11 Manuel I to Eugene III, March [1147], in Ohnsorge,” 408; Niketas Choniates, Nicatae Choniatae Historia, edited by I. A. Van Dieten. CFHB. Vol. 11/1 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1975), 61 (cited hereafter as Choniates). This request was repeated (and granted) later at a meeting with the emperor’s embassy in Regensburg. It seems that the promise of some confirmation was made also during crusader’s march through the Balkans. Ioannes Kinnamos, Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gestarum, edited by A. Meineke. CSHB (Bonn: Weber, 1836), 67, 82 (cited hereafter as Kinnamos); Odo, 26.

12 Choniates, 61. The repairs are mentioned also in a poem of so called Manganeios Prodromos, an anonymous Byzantine eulogist, whose works are still waiting for a modern edition. Extracts of the poem on crusader’s passage of Bosphorus (no. 24 according to the Jeffreys’ numbering) are quoted in Elizabeth Jeffreys and Michael Jeffreys, “Wild Beast from the West;” and in RHC Grec 2. Hereafter cited as Manganeios, in Jeffreys or as Manganeios, in RHC. For the fortification repairs see Manganeios, in Elizabeth Jeffreys and Michael Jeffreys, “The ‘Wild Beast from the West’: Immediate
and a truce with Sultan Masud of Konya.\textsuperscript{13} All these precautions imply mistrust on the Byzantine side. There were many rational reasons for caution: the launch of the crusade contrary to Byzantine interests, Louis’s suspicious negotiations with Sicily, and the experience of plunder during the First Crusade. Therefore it is difficult to say if the emperor acted also out of some irrational prejudice.\textsuperscript{14} Whatever the case, in his letters to France and Rome, Manuel restrained his displeasure behind a veil of an accommodating attitude, expressions of joy, and promises of market and free passage for the crusaders.\textsuperscript{15}

The calm atmosphere changed during the second phase (July – October 1147) due to the first personal contacts between the Western armies, imperial embassies and the Byzantine population of the Balkans. Our knowledge of emotions on the Byzantine side remains vague. Manuel’s suspicion of the crusaders’ true intentions must have increased after Roger II of Sicily in the meantime attacked the western parts of Byzantium. Jonathan Phillips suitably pointed out that the Sicilian invasion “\textit{formed a constant backdrop to the progress of both the German and the French crusaders},”\textsuperscript{16} who were suspected of collaboration with enemies. Independently of the court’s


\textsuperscript{13} Kinnamos, 45, 59. The twelve-year truce formally terminated Manuel’s punitive expedition of 1146, which had reached as far as Konya, the capital of the Sultanate of Rum. Paul Magdalino, \textit{The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143 – 1180} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 42.

\textsuperscript{14} This question forms part of a much more complicated problem to which my attention was drawn by helpful remarks of Professor Michael Jeffreys, for which I am very thankful. Where do we draw a line between rational and irrational? Could Manuel’s prejudice still be called irrational in context of the above mentioned factors? This problem cannot be solved here in all its complexity, but at least with regard to Manuel’s precautions I am inclined to believe that these were perfectly logical practical actions stemming from actual geopolitical situation and experience. Objectively, passage of such a great foreign army was bound to cause problems, thus the caution was neither extreme nor groundless. Sibyll Kindlimann, \textit{Die Eroberung von Konstantinopel als politische Forderung des Westens im Hochmittelalter : Studien zur Entwicklung der Idee eines lateinischen Kaiserreichs in Byzanz} (Zürich: Fretz und Wasmuth Verlag, 1969), 155.

\textsuperscript{15} Manuel I to Eugene III, August 1146, RHGF 15, 440; Manuel I to Louis VII, 1146, RHGF 16, 9; Manuel I to Eugene III, March [1147], in Ohnsorge, 408.

\textsuperscript{16} Phillips, \textit{The Second Crusade}, 170. Sicilian fleet was attacking Byzantine islands and coast since the end of summer 1147, gradually seizing among others Corfu, Corinth and Thebes. Otto of Freising, \textit{Gesta Friderici}, 53–54; Choniates, 62, 72-76; Kinnamos. 92.
concerns, an emotional turmoil is well documented at the level of the crowds by contemporary accounts of the crusaders’ plunder and the flight of local inhabitants in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{17} Manuel did not, however, let the fear and aversion of his subjects break out into an open conflict, which he could not afford and which would thwart other plans he might have had with the crusaders.\textsuperscript{18} Instead, he maintained frequent friendly correspondence with King Louis and reinforced Constantinople’s defences.\textsuperscript{19} According to Niketas Choniates writing in the first decades of the thirteenth century, the emperor also sent his troops to control crusader’s violence, but this was to be done “\textit{in a pacific manner and not by engaging in combat.”}\textsuperscript{20}

Obviously, the French attitude underwent some changes as well. The first meeting with an imperial embassy in Regensburg passed quite peaceably, but the subsequent march through the Byzantine Balkans had a much worse effect. There were several factors that emerge from the sources as triggers of ill feelings: high exchange rates; refusal on behalf of the fearful local inhabitants to cooperate and provide goods for sale; criminal activities of certain Byzantines who enriched themselves with crusaders’ possessions; and the activity of the emperor’s troops.\textsuperscript{21} The behaviour of the Byzantines towards the French is often excused by the economic situation and wild looting of the preceding German army that had caused great fear and mistrust.\textsuperscript{22} It is unlikely, though, that all the French realised this. What they could perceive at the first sight was that the same Greeks who had promised them easy passage actually withdrew

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{17} Odo, 40, 44, 56, 66.
\textsuperscript{18} Manuel clearly stated his desire for an oath concerning restoration of former imperial territories recovered from the Turks. Manuel I to Eugene III, August 1146, RHGF 15, 440; Manuel I to Louis VII, 1146, RHGF 16, 9; Manuel I to Eugene III, March [1147], in Ohnsorge, 408-409. Manuel might have already thought of a French-Byzantine anti-Sicilian alliance, which later became one of the topics of a conference in Chalcedon. Odo, 82.
\textsuperscript{19} Odo, 56; Kinnamos, 72, 82; Choniates, 62.
\textsuperscript{20} ‘...τοῖς δ’ ἑπισκήπτει τῇ στρατιᾷ παρέπεσθαι τῶν Ἀλαμανῶν, μὴ ἀφισταμένοις ἐπὶ πολύ, κὰκ τοῦτο εἰργαῖν τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἀλαμανῶν ἐς ἀρπαγάς παρεξίόντας καὶ προνομάς, εἰρηνικῶς μέντοι καὶ μὴ πολεμικῶς.’ Choniates, 62. The author mentions dispatch of the troops to control German looting. Undoubtedly, the Germans were the main target of this preventive measure, but the French encountered the Byzantine forces as well. Odo, 46, 54. Dispatch of forces with the police-like function under generals Prosuch and Basileios Tzikandyles is recorded also at Kinnamos, 72-3.
\textsuperscript{21} Odo, 40, 44, 46, 54.
\end{footnotesize}
their goods, hid inside their cities, exchanged money at an unfair rate and sent their soldiers against them. A contrast between the crusaders’ expectations and reality must have been evident and I assume that it was already at this point that disappointment revived the stereotype of the treacherous Greek.

Odo of Deuil’s accounts of several Byzantine embassies to Louis VII may imply the revival of another traditional prejudice, that of Greek double-faced flattery, though these passages bear strong signs of the author’s bias stemming from later experiences that obscure real reactions towards the envoys’ conduct. On the other hand, the chronicler also expressed curiosity and interest in the foreign country with its beautiful chapels, distinct fashion and specific customs. Similar positive feelings were certainly shared by other crusaders who for the first time encountered the exotic eastern culture. Their emotions towards Byzantium cannot be interpreted one-sidedly all the more that we know of the existence of two factions among the French, Odo being a supporter only of the radical one, which was more sensitive to the problems with the Greeks.

To summarize, during the emotionally strained situation in the Balkans one can trace the first hints of re-emerging stereotypical images, although the evidence is not persuasive enough to pronounce a definitive verdict. Undoubtedly, French-Byzantine relations deteriorated once masses came into contact, but these problems were still minor. Louis himself – always the decisive figure – did not utter a single critical word on account of the Greeks when describing the Balkan journey in his letter to abbot Suger from October 1147. He kept frequent correspondence with Manuel and nothing suggests that his intention to continue their cooperation faltered; thus pragmatic thinking and practical interest of decisive circles around the emperor and the king managed to overcome the first wave of growing antipathies.

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23 Odo, 26, 56.

24 Ibid., 24-26, 54-56.


Constantinople and beyond: evolution of a conflict

Louis’s stay in Constantinople and Chalcedon in October 1147, which was an important accelerator of development, forms another distinct part. Following Odo of Deuil’s narrative, as soon as Louis approached the capital, French emotions were stirred up by two pieces of news concerning Manuel’s truce with sultan Masud of Konya, and a skirmish between the Byzantine army and a French vanguard. Consequently, at least a part of the crusaders interpreted Byzantine actions in accord with the negative clichés and repeatedly used Greek treachery as an argument for a proposed attack against Constantinople. The immediate outburst of violence in Chalcedon after the French crossed the Bosphorus proves further that under the guise of friendly gestures, banquets and entertainments, the atmosphere during the visit in Constantinople must already have been tense and filled with mistrust.

Nevertheless, the situation was not as bad as the chronicler wanted us to believe. In fact, a conciliatory faction of Louis’s council held majority against the radicals and enjoyed the king’s support. Another one of his letters to Suger praised the emperor for due welcome and care; French appreciation of the visit in Constantinople was recorded also by William, archbishop of Tyre, and, to some extent, even by Odo of Deuil, and even he had to admit that many crusaders excused the later Byzantine hostility in Chalcedon as a result of French pillaging.

As far as the Byzantine sentiment is concerned, two late twelfth and early thirteenth century Greek authors, Ioannes Kinnamos and Niketas Choniates, commented on the French passage of the Bosphorus in neutral or, in Kinnamos’s case, even in a positive

28 Odo, 58, 58-70, 78. We share the editor’s opinion that the passage on page 58: ‘...rumores de imperatore quos iam ex parte retulimus reportantes. Tunc fuere qui consulerent retrocedere et terram opulentissimam cum castellis et urbibus capere et ... ipsam Constantinopolim expugnaret.’ is an unmistakable allusion to the above mentioned events described on pages 50-54.

29 In Chalcedon the French caused havoc at a market and robbed Greek merchants. During the subsequent diplomatic clash the emperor stopped a flow of provisions. Odo, 74.


31 Odo, 72.
way, which implies that any frictions were not serious enough for a long-term remembrance. Fortunately, a eulogy of so-called Manganeios Prodromos written shortly after the French visit of Constantinople and Chalcedon reflected Byzantine moods in their proper time. Manganeios confirmed the application of Latin stereotypes when he compared the crusaders (French and German likewise) to “beasts” that “came as if to capture and devour” the capital. An analysis of events such as the Byzantine carefully measured efforts to relieve a potential threat by transporting the crusaders to the other side of Bosphorus and a harsh reaction to the violent incident in Chalcedon reveals two main aspects determining the fluctuating attitude of the imperial court towards the French: the violence of their army and the willingness, or rather unwillingness, of Louis’s barons to accept Manuel’s demand of homage. All in all, the crusaders were viewed as beasts, as a threat of which Byzantines wanted to rid themselves as soon as possible, but not before the emperor secured his political interests.

As discussed above, the stereotypes of Greek perfidy and Latin violence were definitely revived in this situation. But neither Manuel nor Louis let these antipathies intervene with their practical needs. Manuel had to concentrate his imperial forces against the Sicilian invasion and wanted the homage that would guarantee safety of his realm from crusaders’ attack as well as future control over potentially re-conquered imperial territories, whereas Louis needed Byzantine help during a difficult journey through Asia Minor. The behaviour of both rulers in Constantinople and Chalcedon shows that there was a will to compromise. Finally, on October 26 they concluded an agreement with the following conditions: provisions and guides in exchange for the safety of the empire and the homage of French barons. The fact that they were able to

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32 The poem was an official assignment intended to public audience of eyewitnesses; therefore, although it is a piece of propaganda, its credibility should not be contested. Jeffreys and Jeffreys, “Wild Beast from the West,” 104. On the contrary, its bias has a great importance for the present subject.


34 Odo, 72-78; Choniates, 66. Epistolary evidence together with conditions of a final French-Byzantine agreement displays an obvious link between the ‘homagium’ (sic) of the French barons and the oath of the first crusaders to Emperor Alexios I. See above, note 18

35 The emperor took a great care of his visitors in Constantinople and strategically withheld his demands until the crusaders crossed Bosphorus to safer distance from the city. Louis, on the other hand, was ready to compensate Greek victims for crimes of his own men and was eventually willing to accept Manuel’s controversial conditions. Odo, 58-60, 66-68, 80-82; Louis VII to Suger, 1148, RHGF 15, 496; William of Tyre, Historia, 665. To rich imperial gifts bestowed upon the crusading elites alludes also Manganeios, in RHC, 758.
conclude such an alliance in spite of emotionally strained relations is the best proof of political restraint on both sides.

Shortly after the French left the Bosphorus setting out for the last phase of their journey through Byzantium, they were once again confronted with the lack of market for subsidies, stealing and high prices. The locals refused to cooperate, the crusaders plundered and the Byzantines answered by the evacuation of their cities and punitive assaults. Moreover, Manuel supposedly never provided the guides he had promised, while the Byzantines in Asia Minor were said to have cooperated with the Turks against the westerners. \(^{36}\) Louis’ chaplain wrote his chronicle having fresh in his memory all the hardships of the difficult march through Asia Minor; thus we can finally take Odo’s anti-Byzantine remarks as a primary reflection of moods among the radical part of the French in this last stage. \(^{37}\) As such, the chronicle proves the application of all the Greek stereotypes mentioned before - treachery, weakness, indolence, etc. \(^{38}\) Furthermore, in contrast with the previous phases, there are neither even small hints of excuses for the Byzantine behaviour, nor any further discussions about the morality of an attack against other Christians. This disappearance of pro-Byzantine voices from our source might be indicative of greater unity of the French with regard to Greeks, but such interpretation is uncertain and explanations may vary.

A crucial piece of evidence for changes in the sentiments is Louis’ letter sent to Suger after his arrival to Antioch. The king complained in the following words: “In these parts [Asia Minor] we suffered not a few injuries both because of a fraud of the emperor and because of our fault.” \(^{39}\) He also accused the emperor of having given permission to the Turks to attack the crusaders. \(^{40}\) Regardless of the questionable righteousness of the accusations, they demonstrate Louis’s eventual inclination to the anti-Byzantine attitude although expressed in milder words than those of his chaplain. I believe that the change of the king’s stance can be viewed as an evidence for discontent

\(^{36}\) Odo, 82, 96, 104-112.

\(^{37}\) See note 4.

\(^{38}\) Examples are scattered throughout the whole chronicle and too numerous to cite.

\(^{39}\) ‘In quibus sane partibus, tum pro fraude Imperatoris tum pro culpa nostrorum, non pauca damna pertulimus...’ Louis VII to Suger, 1148, RHGF 15, 496.

\(^{40}\) Louis VII to Suger, 1148, RHGF 15, 496. For further discussion of these allegations and balance of power in Asia Minor that prevented Manuel from helping the crusaders see: Černáková, “Byzantsko-francúzske vzťahy,” 72-75; Magdalino, Empire, 124-126; Phillips, The Second Crusade, 178, 206; Jason T. Roche, “Conrad III and the Second Crusade in the Byzantine Empire and Anatolia, 1147” (PhD diss., University of St Andrews, 2008), 138; Berry, “The Second Crusade,” 465, 498; Bernhard Kugler, Studien zur Geschichte des zweiten Kreuzzuges (Stuttgart: Ebner & Seubert, 1866), 146-147.
spreading beyond the borders of Odo’s radical group. Dissatisfaction of the ruler as an authority figure together with overall animosity of the crowd, clearly visible in its violent actions against local population, would strengthen and confirm this trend.

If we give some credit to the French description (partially confirmed by Choniates) of Greek hostility, it seems that the emotions of the locals in Asia Minor were a mixture of fear and thirst for vengeance. From a certain point onwards, the situation resembled an open war.

The locals fled leaving no provisions behind and, most probably, cooperated with the Turks who harassed the pilgrims. When Louis’s decimated army reached the Byzantine port Antalya in late January 1148, Manuel’s embassy forced Louis’s barons to renew their oath from October 1147. If the oath had to be renewed, it is obvious that at some point of the journey the alliance with Manuel broke up and mutual aversion was no longer restrained by politics.

The key moment must have been the king’s meeting with Manuel’s envoys in Ephesus. It is indicated not only by the subsequent intensification of conflicts but also by the course of the meeting itself. First of all, Louis refused Manuel’s advice to take refuge from the Turks in Byzantine coastal cities. Subsequently, the emperor accused the crusaders of many injuries proclaiming his inability to stop Byzantine revenge. Without any response, the king took a route through the hinterland. There are no more records of communication or cooperation with the imperial court afterwards, not until the French reached Antalya. It would normally have been easier to continue from Ephesus along the coast under the protection of Byzantine strongholds, but the general impression is that Louis did not believe in the effectiveness of such an arrangement anymore. My conclusion therefore is that after all the negative experiences that had stirred up emotions on both sides he deemed any cooperation with Byzantines futile and feared that the mutual hostility combined with Greek untrustworthiness would make this path more dangerous than Turkish raids in the hinterland.

The way to this final breach was long. The traditional prejudices between Greeks and Latins did not emerge right at the beginning of the Second Crusade and without a foundation of concrete experience they were unable to provoke powerful emotions that would influence historical events. On the contrary, it was only after certain emotionally strained situations (e.g. French plunder or Byzantine attacks in Asia Minor) that people began to associate present problems with the known clichés. We must also remember


42 Odo, 128.

43 Ibid., 106-108.
that the French and the Byzantines consisted of many smaller divisions (court, commons, conciliatory party, radicals), which had unequal shares of bellicose attitude. Finally, it is noteworthy that in spite of these boiling emotions, the two rulers were able to make practical political decisions and to cooperate as long as it was possible and profitable. Thus the Second Crusade serves an example against the generalization and overestimation of the influence of mutual prejudices, which must be perceived as a predisposition rather than as a reason, on the relations between Byzantium and the Latin West.

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